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Adverse Selection, Moral Hazard, and Outlier Payment Policy

8 Juni, 2009 | DRG International, Fachartikel, Finanzierung, Qualität

Michel Mougeot, Florence Naegelen:
Adverse Selection, Moral Hazard, and Outlier Payment Policy
Journal of Risk & Insurance, Vol. 76, No. 1., pp. 177-195, John Wiley & Sons

[Citeulike]
[DOI: 10.1111/j.1539-6975.2009.01293.x]

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Adverse Selection, Moral Hazard, and Outlier Payment Policy

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